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The Customer Forum – Putting Customers at the Centre of Regulating Water Services   
Dr Sarah Hendry, Lecturer in Law, Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science (under the auspices of 
Unesco), University of Dundee s.m.hendry@dundee.ac.uk 1 
Abstract: 
This article will explore recent initiatives in customer engagement in water services in Scotland, UK. 
Scotland has a well-established and successful model for water services regulation and governance, 
with a public supplier performing as efficiently as the top quartile of private English companies. One 
recent innovation has been a form of negotiated settlement between the provider and a group 
representing customers, as part of the price setting process. The paper will assess the initial 
intention and the subsequent evolution of this initiative, arguing that such developments can work 
well, when conditions are right. Enabling conditions may include a surrounding regulatory structure 
that is sufficiently mature and performing sufficiently well. It will offer some reflections on the 
process and on the role of such a body in the future, and will also posit that there are features of 
public sector providers that may make these more, rather than less, conducive to efficient and 
effective service delivery in the customer interest.  
Key words: 
Water services regulation, economic regulation, customer engagement, price setting, public sector 
efficiency, negotiated settlements  
 
1. Introduction  
                                                          
1 My thanks to those who have read and commented on drafts of this paper, including the anonymous 
reviewers. Any errors or misconceptions of course remain my own. 
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The regulation of water services is of interest to service providers, policymakers, economists and 
lawyers, and of course to water users – the customers or potential customers of the service, as well 
as those who compete with them for access to the resource. ‘Economic regulation’ can be construed 
narrowly, to relate only to the prices charged for the services provided, or more broadly, to include 
aspects of environmental compliance, and social tariffs for the poor and unserved. This paper will 
take that broader view, for both environmental and social factors are essential to developing 
appropriate service standards for the benefit of all customers, existing and future. Whilst in the past 
economic regulation was seen as necessary for the private sector, there is also (and increasingly) 
recognition of the necessity of regulating the public sector (see, e.g. World Bank, 2004; OECD, 2011). 
This is true in other networked industries that are natural monopolies, but perhaps especially for 
water, as most water services continue to be delivered, or have assets owned, by public authorities. 
Further, in recent times there has been a new focus on governance, as well as regulation, of water 
services and again, this is pertinent to the public and private sectors (OECD, 2015). As part of that 
governance agenda, there is a pressing need to engage better with customers of the service, 
especially in terms of price setting, standards, and the trade-offs between these; these questions 
arise in both developed and developing countries. This paper will examine recent innovations in 
Scotland, which is part of the UK but has separate provision for water services and where the 
economic regulator, working with the service provider and other regulators, established a new body, 
the Customer Forum, to represent customers in the price setting process, during the 2015 strategic 
review of charges. The Forum evolved to become a negotiating body, effectively agreeing a business 
plan with the service provider. That evolution will be discussed below, suggesting ways in which the 
experience in Scotland might provide a useful example to other places seeking to enhance the role 
of customers, and drawing comparisons with England, which has a similar regulatory model but a 
different ownership structure. The paper’s author was a member of the Forum and will therefore be 
able to combine academic analysis with an experiential understanding of the process. For this reason 
the paper will occasionally use the first person. It should be noted that others are producing reviews 
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of the work of the Forum, from different perspectives. This includes other academic analysis 
(Littlechild, 2014); and also a ‘legacy report’ produced by the Forum itself (Customer Forum, 2015). 
Much general background and detailed discussion can be gleaned from these documents. This article 
will focus on the regulatory and governance initiative in a comparative context, giving some personal 
views as a Forum member but also drawing on other work in regulation of water services and 
suggesting ways in which the process might – or might not – be of interest to others.  
 
2. The Regulatory Model and Ownership Structure of Water Services in Scotland  
 Scotland’s water services industry has a similar regulatory model, but a very different ownership 
structure, from that in England, where services were divested in the 1980s to form a series of 
vertically integrated regional monopolies2 (Bakker, 2003). These were and are subject to price cap 
regulation (Ogus, 1994); but in recent years the system has been perceived as burdensome for both 
regulated and regulator, and attempts have been made to lessen this in the most recent (2014) 
periodic review of prices (Cave, 2009). The ‘English model’ of full divestiture is well known, though it 
is not the most widely used form of private sector participation for water; it was applied to utilities 
throughout the UK, but divestiture did not take place for water in Scotland (Hendry, 2003). 
Scotland’s water services were delivered by regional authorities until 1996, then by three appointed 
regional water boards, and since 2003, by a single public corporation, ‘Scottish Water’.3 The move 
from municipal provision to separate water entities has been a feature of reforms of the delivery of 
water services in many countries and was an important part of the development of the regulatory 
model in Scotland. It required – and enabled - much better accounting separation. The 
‘commercialisation’ or ‘corporatisation’ of water services is sometimes controversial, as it may be 
seen as a precursor to ‘privatisation’ (see for example McDonald and Ruiters 2005) and of course 
                                                          
2 Water Act (UK) 1989 c.15. 
3 Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002 asp.3 (WISA). 
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this may be the case. However, accounting separation of complex and capital-intensive services is a 
useful activity in itself, enabling better understanding of the costs of delivery over time and aiding 
transparency and accountability. This happens, for example, in municipal service provision above a 
certain threshold in Australian states.4  Such financial clarity is beneficial, whether or not the service 
remains with a municipality, is transferred to a specific public sector vehicle, or is to be subject to 
private sector participation.   
Scottish Water is a vertically integrated supplier, managing the whole supply chain from catchment 
to sea and serving almost all of the population with water and wastewater services. As a public 
corporation it is essentially owned by the Scottish Government, and the Government issues both 
policy objectives (Scottish Government, 2014) and a set of ‘principles of charging’ (Scottish 
Government, 2014a). The objectives are issued in the form of Directions and are binding on the 
regulators.5   
Within that policy framework, Scottish Water has four main regulators. The Water Industry 
Commission for Scotland (WICS) was established in 2006 and is the economic regulator. 6 Unusually 
for the public sector, the WICS is not merely an advisory body but determines charges within each 
review period (currently, every six years). There is a Drinking Water Quality Regulator, which 
monitors and enforces standards for public supply (by Scottish Water) and oversees the 
management of private supply.7 The environmental regulator is the Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency, which licences abstractions and discharges and also leads the river basin planning process 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., in Queensland, Local Government (Qld) Act 2009 No.17; Local Government Regulation 2012 SL 
No.236. 
5 WISA s.56A. 
6 Under the Water Services (Scotland) Act 2005 asp.3 (2005 Act). Prior to that, from 1999-2006 there was a 
single Commissioner, who advised Government on prices.  
7 Also under the Water Services (Scotland) Act 2005. Private supplies would include individual and community 
schemes beyond the limits of Scottish Water’s networks.  
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under the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD; European Commission, 2000). As a vertically 
integrated supplier, Scottish Water is a major stakeholder in river basin planning and carries out 
measures under the river basin plans, which contribute to environmental improvements and other 
public goods such as flood defence, carbon reduction and biodiversity. All of these activities are part 
of the regulatory settlement and charges are set accordingly. The final regulator is responsible for 
consumer advocacy and that role is currently exercised by Citizens’ Advice Scotland, in a complex 
and rapidly changing environment (see section 4 below).  
Scottish Water’s activities are funded by charges which are broadly cost-reflective within each of 
household and business customers, and government borrowing, currently around £120m / annum. 
Their capital programme amounts to around £500m / annum. There is some cross-subsidy, 
especially between urban and rural customers. The Government operates a ‘Quality and Standards’ 
process, by which all the regulators and the Government agree the technical detail of Scottish 
Water’s investment programme. In essence, Scottish Water develops a draft business plan, 
containing their proposals for the next strategic review period. The WICS assesses this in the light of 
the ongoing reporting which they (and other regulators) require from Scottish Water, and then 
issues a draft determination, which is put out to consultation – to the Ministers, Scottish Water and 
the customer representatives, and also published for public comment.8 The Commission must have 
regard to any directions or other guidance issued by the Ministers.9 Once the determination is 
finalised, Scottish Water have the right to appeal, to the (UK) Competition and Markets Authority.10 
Otherwise, the determination will apply through that pricing period. There is the possibility of an 
                                                          
8 WISA s.29B  
9 WISA s.29C  
10 Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2005/3172 (a 
Westminster order, as it is a reserved function).  
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‘interim determination’ if circumstances change outwith Scottish Water’s control (for example, new 
legislation or some other ‘external shock’),11 and the WICS may request Scottish Water to so apply.   
Scottish Water will finalise its business plan, and then issue a charging scheme annually, within the 
overall settlement, and the WICS will approve that yearly (and may modify it, with reasons). 12  The 
charging scheme must enable Scottish Water to provide its core services ‘effectively’ and comply 
with any policy statement.13 Effective exercise of core functions is then defined as complying with 
the objectives in the Directions, at the ‘lowest reasonable overall cost’.14  
Although Scottish Water is a public entity, there is some private sector participation in the sector in 
Scotland. This includes elements of Scottish Water’s supply chain, but also some wastewater Public-
Private-Partnership (PPP) schemes introduced in the 1990s, and more recently some retail 
competition. The PPP schemes used Build-Own-Operate contracts with engineering consortia, to 
construct plant to meet EU urban water treatment standards (European Commission 1991), but led 
both to very large end-of-pipe solutions and to lifecycle costs well in excess of public borrowing for 
new plant (albeit off the public balance sheet). These contracts will soon be at an end and this 
approach will not be used again in water in Scotland, although similar PPP schemes have been 
widely used in the UK, for example in transport, for schools and hospitals.  
The retail market is more relevant to current policy developments. A decision was made to open the 
market, for business customers only, and for retail services only (Hendry 2008).15 Licensed providers 
                                                          
11 WISA s.29F 
12 WISA s.29A  
13 WISA s.29C 
14 WISA s.29G 
15 Under the Water Services (Scotland) Act 2005. England is currently opening their retail markets under a 
much more ambitious scheme under the Water Act 2014, which will have consequences for Scotland which 
are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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of retail services are licensed and regulated by WICS. Scottish Water was required to separate out 
and ring-fence their own retail activities (into ‘Scottish Water Business Stream’); most other 
licensees come from the English water utilities. Although relatively small numbers of business 
customers transferred, the WICS’ view is that the existence of competition has improved the 
efficiency of Business Stream (WICS, 2013).16 Licensed providers can rationalise billing for entities 
with multiple sites, and offer water efficiency advice. They are prohibited (as are all persons or 
entities except Scottish Water) from putting water into the public system, or taking wastewater 
out.17  Importantly, Scottish Water publishes its wholesale price to the retailers, so there is a high 
degree of transparency. The position of business customers was recognised as relevant to the work 
of the Forum and the legacy report notes that business customers need to be represented more 
effectively, not just in any future Forum but also in relation to Scottish Water generally (Customer 
Forum 2015). Because customers have contracts with the licensed providers, Scottish Water may 
take the view that they do not have a direct relationship with those customers. Nonetheless Scottish 
Water provides the wholesale service and connection to the infrastructure. The process for the 
latter can be problematic, as can some remaining cross-subsidies between business customers. One 
of the outcomes of the Forum’s work was a recognition by Scottish Water that business customers’ 
views should be better incorporated into Scottish Water’s performance assessment in future.  
Following divestiture in England, the water undertakers were regulated using competition by 
comparison, and in Scotland a similar set of criteria were applied in order to use the English 
providers as benchmarks. Improvements were incentivised, just as happened with the private 
undertakers in England; Scottish Water was allowed to retain any outperformance within the period 
of any one price review. Comparison with England, and a rigorous approach to data collection, 
reporting and auditing, enabled the WICS to drive efficiency gains and in a 10 year period, Scottish 
                                                          
16 Most recently, Anglia Water succeeded in winning the public sector contract from Business Stream, for all 
local authorities, hospitals and educational establishments. 
17 2005 Act, ss.4-5. 
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Water’s performance across a basket of measures increased from the bottom of the English 
comparators, to the upper quartile. This has been a commendable process, achieving private sector 
efficiency in the public sector, and is one of the reasons why the system in Scotland might be of 
interest to other countries carrying out their own reforms.  
The early strategic reviews in Scotland were both data-intensive and adversarial. As might be 
expected where supply had been provided by local authorities, without any accounting separation 
and with other, higher profile commitments, the data was often disputed, or simply unavailable. 
Further, the relationship between Scottish Water and the WICS was problematic, resulting in 2006 in 
a failure to agree a business plan and the resignation of Scottish Water’s chairman.18 In the 10 years 
since then, much has changed, as evidenced by the progressive reductions in the volume of data 
produced in successive strategic reviews.19 It is often argued that regulation, rather than ownership, 
is the key to improving performance and in the 1990s that argument was made in relation to the 
English undertakers (Renzetti and Dupont, 2006). If so, then in the early years of this century 
Scotland appears to provide evidence for that from the public sector, rather than the private. 
However the 2015 review was qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, different. In part, this arose 
from the desire to reduce the regulatory burden; and in part, from developments in thinking around 
governance.  
 
3. Governance, Representation and the Regulatory Burden 
                                                          
18 Scottish Parliament Environment and Rural Development Committee Hearing on Scottish Water 22 March 
2006 col.2937-2953 available at http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/environment/or-
06/ra06-1002.htm#Col2937  




Governance is pervasive in relation to water resource management (Rogers and Hall, 2013; OECD 
2015a) and to water services regulation (Stern and Holder, 1999; OECD 2015), but it is fundamentally 
a political concept (Stoker, 1998). It is a multi-faceted understanding of social organisation that is 
wider than the state; it may fill gaps where government authority is weak, or provide counter-
balance where the state is over-strong. Different authors have identified different governance 
attributes, but from a legal perspective three core elements contributing to good governance would 
be transparency (access to information), participation, and accountability (access to justice). These 
attributes are often analysed in relation to participation in environmental decision-making, for 
example under the Aarhus Convention (UN/ECE, 1999) or the Rio Declaration (UN, 1992).  
In relation to water resource management, good water governance is often tied into improved 
public and stakeholder participation, for example in river basin planning processes, where there is an 
understanding that water users should be involved in management decisions (OECD, 2015a). 
Participation was one of the ‘Dublin Principles’ (Dublin Statement, 1992) and is widely discussed in 
the literature and practice. Governance is also highly relevant to water services provision, where it 
can be used to refer to the broad regulatory system and also to the relationship between service 
providers, regulators and customers. Transparency, participation and accountability are again 
essential structural mechanisms to deliver good governance, and transparency and accountability 
can both be seen as formal provisions which the law can enable; insofar as the rule of law is 
effective, then information will flow and there will be functioning mechanisms to achieve justice. 
Participation though is much more complex – whether in service regulation, resource management 
or any other area of decision-making – and that is especially true if efforts are to be made to go 
beyond formal consultation, or working with major corporate or institutional stakeholders, and 
actually enable engagement of citizens in decision-making (see, for example, Arnstein, 1969; Fung, 
2006; and specific to water, UNDP, 2013). Participation requires information and it requires redress 
for failure, but those preconditions are not sufficient. Participation is also time-consuming and 
requires effective social mechanisms. Further, in relation to water services especially, although data 
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may be supplied, that data is often very complex, highly specialised, and difficult to interpret. This is 
true both of the data around the service provision and the data around its economic regulation. 
Therefore active engagement of citizens is especially difficult to achieve. Yet that participation is 
vital. Water services are a basic need and almost always delivered by monopoly, whether public or 
private. There are significant asymmetries of information – and the consumer is least informed of all 
– yet the consumer both pays the price and suffers the service standards. Consumers might, if 
enabled, have meaningful views on the trade-offs that are inevitably made between prices and 
standards in the broadest sense. The questions then are how to engage consumers, and how to 
ensure that the information provided to enable that participation is useful as well as available.  
Although the difficulties with participation might make it less attractive as a part of formal decision-
making, economic regulation is always problematic and resource-intensive. In England, concern 
about the regulatory burden and the volume of data collected and reported on was one driver of 
change (Cave, 2009), as was the need to give a greater voice to customers (Gray, 2011, OFWAT 
2011). Partly, this was prompted by a recognition that the English water and sewerage undertakers 
were reaching what might be termed a ‘regulatory plateau’. In England, the water and sewerage 
undertakers were assessed and scored against a set of 17 measures (the Overall Performance 
Assessment). The same measures were reported on in Scotland to allow benchmarking. However, as 
technical compliance rose, it becomes difficult to use these measures to force continued 
improvement. In England the regulator moved away from both the Overall Performance Assessment 
and the detailed reporting on and assessment against similar data sets. Amongst other reforms, the 
regulator introduced a Service Incentive Mechanism which rated customer satisfaction. This new 
focus on customers also reflected work by Littlechild, who had been instrumental in developing the 
price cap model in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and was now considering whether a better approach 
might be an increased focus on the customer and what the customer might want from the service 
provider, using the sorts of negotiated settlements common in utilities’ regulation in some US states 
(Doucet and Littlechild, 2006; Littlechild, 2008, 2011). Such a customer-oriented approach fits well 
11 
 
with an emphasis on governance frameworks. As well as the Service Incentive Mechanism, it was 
decided to establish Customer Challenge Groups, which would be part of the business planning 
process for the English undertakers (OFWAT 2011). The Challenge Groups, unlike the Forum in 
Scotland, were not representative of customers but rather composed of various agencies and 
regulators, such as local authorities, the Environment Agency, etc., as well as the Consumer Council 
for Water (a statutory body representing customers in England and Wales and with a similar remit to 
that now held by Citizens’ Advice in Scotland).20  
The regulatory plateau and the regulatory burden were both drivers for reform in England, but there 
were other pressures. Whereas Scotland has just one major supplier, in England there are ten large 
water and sewerage undertakers, nine water-only companies, and a number of small operators and 
licensed suppliers, each with their own geographical area and variable licence conditions.21 Thus the 
regulator’s role is inevitably more complex. Further, as English providers are fully divested, there is 
an additional pressure from investors, whether lenders or shareholders, to achieve a good return. 
WaterUK (a trade body) estimated in the run-up to the 2014 price review that on average, investors 
received around 5% on their investment (WaterUK, 2013). That would be a good return for a private 
investor in current times, but more importantly perhaps is a reasonable average in an industry like 
water. As an essential service and a natural monopoly (whether public or private) it should be a 
stable investment over time. However, any average can mask significant disparities, and private 
monopolies are always open to criticism. In the run-up to the 2014 price review, there were 
concerns that the boards were (unsurprisingly) seeking commercial advantage for their investors at 
the expense of customers’ interests, inter alia by manipulating (lawfully) the tax regime or the 
balance between equity and debt (see, for a critical appraisal, Turner, 2013). This is the natural 
                                                          
20 See generally, and for links to the archive documentation http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulated-
companies/price-review/price-review-2014/customer-engagement/  




tendency of firms, but it is also the regulator’s role to control that tendency. When the Challenge 
Groups were established, the understanding was that if companies could reach agreement with their 
customers, this would be evidence of their eligibility for ‘enhanced standing’ – an expedited 
regulatory process. However, although most companies did reach agreement with their Challenge 
Group, OFWAT only granted advanced standing to two companies (OFWAT 2014). As will be 
examined below, the Customer Challenge Groups were not afforded the same degree of regulatory 
backing that was made available to the Customer Forum in Scotland.  
 
4. The Customer Forum – Establishment and Remit 
Influenced by these developments in England, and the emerging literature, it was agreed to establish 
a body known as the Customer Forum in Scotland. The intention was to create a less adversarial, 
more consensual model for agreeing aspects of the strategic review of charges, and the Forum was 
set up under a cooperation agreement signed by the WICS, Scottish Water and the National 
Consumer Council.22 The agreement set out the remit of the Forum and made it clear that Scottish 
Government, and all the regulators, would be part of the process.  
It might be helpful to briefly outline the various bodies already involved in representing consumers 
of water services in Scotland. Until 2010, there was a designated body representing customers of 
Scottish Water – the Customer Consultation Panels, also known as WaterWatch.23 Under the 2005 
Act these had various powers of investigation in relation to complaints etc., and they also had a role 
in relation to developing the policy framework. Whereas the WICS has a general duty to promote the 
interests of the customers, the Panels had the duty to represent their views and interests. They had 
a duty to publish reports and powers to make recommendations, and the Convenors of the Panels 
                                                          
22 Available, with other relevant documents, at 
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_CustomerForum.aspx  
23 The Panels were established under WISA, and their powers extended in the 2005 Act.  
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had a duty to investigate complaints, and a power to obtain information, and could make 
representations. There was a duty of cooperation between the Panels and the WICS. 
In 2010, the Panels were wound up. There was a perceived need to separate the policy function 
from the complaint function, and their advocacy and policy-related functions were transferred (at 
that point) to the National Consumer Council.24 (The National Consumer Council in Scotland was 
known as Consumer Focus, and then as Consumer Futures, during the existence of the Customer 
Forum.) Their investigative powers for second-tier complaints (i.e. those which had been addressed, 
but not resolved, by Scottish Water internally) were transferred to the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman. Subsequently, due to changes in consumer protection at UK level, the powers residing 
with the National Consumer Council in Scotland were again transferred, this time to Citizens’ Advice 
Scotland. Thus it has been a challenging period of rapid change which certainly affected the work of 
the Forum and its relationships with the regulators.  
 The Forum’s costs were met by the WICS, which in turn is funded by a levy from customers. It had 
nine members – a Convenor, appointed by all parties to the agreement; five members nominated by 
the Consumer Council; two members representing the licensed providers; and one from the business 
sector (initially from the Federation of Small Businesses, and later from the Scottish Council for 
Development and Industry). All members were appointed under normal public sector appointment 
rules and conditions. In addition, we were joined by staff from the Consumer Council, who had been 
staff with WaterWatch before that and have since transferred to Citizens’ Advice, providing some 
long-term continuity. We also had some policy support from Scottish Government and in our legacy 
report this was one of the things we identified as a learning point (Customer Forum 2015); more 
consistent and sustained support of that type (not necessarily from Government, but with the 
specialist knowledge we lacked) might have been useful. However support from the WICS especially, 
                                                          
24 Public Sector Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 asp.8.  
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and from Government, made up any real deficiency, although our Convenor was possibly required to 
give rather more time to Forum business than he might have expected.  
The Forum was not intended to reflect the customer base directly; there was no intention that 
Forum members should include members of disadvantaged groups, for example (although five of the 
nine were women, but this was not a design specification). Nor were we expected to have specialist 
knowledge of the industry – of the ordinary members, only two had any specialist water sector 
knowledge. Rather, it brought together a group of people with a wide set of relevant skills, including 
a retired senior civil servant, a lawyer specialising in consumer law, a marketing specialist, and an 
engineer who had previously served on boards of water companies and environmental regulators. 
The two representatives from the licensed providers did of course have specialist expertise and as 
one of them was from an English supplier, he also brought valuable comparative knowledge of the 
industry generally, the price review, and the inclusion of the customer voice, in England. The 
Convenor was a former Minister in the Scottish Government, and Member of the Scottish 
Parliament, who had also convened a large local authority and been involved in many other public 
(and private) bodies and enterprises. The intention was to draw together people who would be able 
to understand the complex evidence and data presented, engage sensibly but not as specialists with 
both Scottish Water and their regulators, and ask – sometimes repeatedly - the questions that a 
consumer might ask. Especially, we asked Scottish Water – ‘why is that (proposed action) in the 
interests of your customers’? The asking of that question essentially forced Scottish Water to 
provide explanations of things that would never need explained if the dialogue remained between 
themselves and the regulators, all of whom had the specialist knowledge we lacked. One further and 
important advantage of being there as individuals was that we had no vested interests or 
institutional positions to maintain. It was also helpful that we did not have an advocacy or policy-
related function – we were very specifically working within the existing policy framework as set out 
by Government, rather than lobbying to change that frame.  
15 
 
The cooperation agreement shows that the Forum was intended to work with all the regulators and 
Scottish Water. The Forum would be involved with Scottish Water’s own customer engagement 
programme and also be able to commission its own customer research if required, as well as 
bringing in specialists of various types to give advice.25 It would have an ‘engagement (sub)-
committee’ that would negotiate directly over aspects of the draft business plan. The WICS’ view 
was that a more consensual process would be more productive; and negotiations with the formal 
regulator, de facto less productive; and they set out their thinking in early documentation on the 
process for the 2015 review (WICS 2013a).  
 
5. An Expanded Remit 
At the start, the Forum was expected to be involved only in what might be described as 
‘discretionary spending’ – that portion of Scottish Water’s costs that do not relate to mandatory 
functions. Mandatory functions would include all legal obligations, including EU law on drinking 
water, wastewater treatment, and other (EU or national) environmental requirements; and anything 
else required by law or within a Government Direction. The remaining discretionary spend was 
inevitably very small. It soon became clear that this was an ineffective way to proceed, especially as 
the timing of mandatory spending could make a significant difference to customers and the service 
they received. As the Forum progressed its discussions with Scottish Water and the regulators, the 
WICS considered that the Forum could play a wider role. 
This may have resulted in part from the Forum’s developing relationship with Scottish Water. 
Although there were a number of challenging meetings – at the start and throughout the process – 
there was involvement of Scottish Water staff at the highest levels. This meant that agreement did 
                                                          
25 Not specifically on the water industry; for example, we obtained advice on water poverty, and on the 
impacts of different measures of inflation. 
16 
 
not subsequently need to be sought from more senior staff, and also that the whole organisation 
knew that the Forum was relevant. Scottish Water began to produce a series of ‘Service 
Improvement Reports’ which analysed and explained their activities.26 Their own staff subsequently 
agreed that it had been a useful exercise for them to develop such reports in terms which an 
intelligent layperson would be able to understand; that sort of explanation would be vital to any 
customer body attempting the sort of work that the Forum did. The Service Improvement Reports 
were later published as annexes to Scottish Water’s business plan (Scottish Water 2014).  
In addition the WICS was providing the Forum with a series of guidance notes,27 and their own 
thinking on the wider regulatory process was developing. The regulatory ‘plateau’ was relevant to 
Scotland, quite apart from the loss of benchmarks when the English companies stopped reporting on 
the basket of measures in the Overall Performance Assessment. Effectively, a relatively stable set of 
standards are currently being met, in a relatively stable environment, with low inflation and minimal 
price increases. Therefore, benchmarking of technical improvements becomes less relevant – but 
identifying, and meeting, the wishes of customers becomes more important, around discretionary 
spend and around the phasing of improvements. Related to this was recognition of the desirability of 
moving to a ‘smoother’ regulatory process. Although a price cap system with defined time periods 
has certain advantages, it also has disadvantages. There is intensive activity in the early part of a 
pricing period, but towards the end there may be a reduction in investment, then a rapid start-up at 
the beginning of the next period, leading to difficulties for the supply chain. Long-term planning is 
important for security of supply, and Scottish Water is required to produce 25-year plans for water 
resources. They now also produce a 25-year ‘strategic projection’, (Scottish Water 2014a) and the six 
year review period sits within that. Further, in the current period, there will be an investment review 
                                                          
26 Covering everything from drinking water supply, to carbon management. 
27 Available at http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_CustomerForum.aspx  
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at the midway point, allowing some readjustment to the capital programme and other commitments 
in 2018 (WICS 2014).  
As part of their guidance, the WICS took a new approach to evidence of financial performance. They 
introduced a set of ‘financial tramlines’ which indicate to Scottish Water and its regulators if it is 
outperforming, or underperforming, in cash and capital value terms; and the levels at which there 
might be concern that this is the trend. As long as Scottish Water’s business plan and performance 
are within the ‘tramlines’, then the regulators can be assured. Over a relatively short period of time, 
it became clear that this would allow the Forum, and its engagement committee which negotiated 
directly with Scottish Water over their business plan, to effectively finalise the business plan within 
the limits and constraints set by the WICS. The tramlines are specifically mentioned in the current 
principles of charging, reflecting the Government’s involvement in, and support for, the process 
(Scottish Government 2014a). Government will decide on what should happen in the event of any 
outperformance above the top line (and Government, with the WICS, on what remedial steps are 
necessary if there is a risk of underperformance). It is also intended that the management of any 
such over- or under-performance would be discussed with customers (such as the Forum, or 
whatever body may replace the Forum in the future).  
The Forum was not a statutory body, and this allowed a degree of flexibility, though it did raise 
questions as to accountability. From the start, the Forum took the view that ultimately, we could be 
called to account, if necessary by the Parliament – and indeed Forum members were received by the 
relevant Parliamentary Committee, our activities discussed and evidence given by the Convenor 
about our work. It is also important to note that the Forum did not in any way demit from the WICS’ 
primary duty to make the determination, and the statutory powers remained vested in all the 
regulators. The ‘Quality and Standards’ process remained in place and the Forum was not involved 
with that other than to be informed of its progress and outcomes. However, a critical point was 
reached when the WICS decided that if the Forum could agree a business plan with Scottish Water 
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that allowed for all the mandatory requirements, met Government objectives and principles of 
charging, and fell within the financial parameters, WICS would be ‘minded to accept’ that entire 
agreement in its determination of charges (WICS 2013a). (For a detailed chronology, see the Forum’s 
legacy report (Customer Forum 2015) and Littlechild, 2014). In Scotland, we knew that the WICS was 
actively supporting the process. However we also knew that if the engagement committee and 
Scottish Water did not reach agreement, then both parties would be required to explain this failure 
and the reasons for it to the regulators. Taken together, these were powerful motivators for both 
sides to encourage positive negotiation.   This was very different to the situation in England with the 
Customer Challenge Groups. In many cases, English providers did succeed in reaching agreement 
with the Customer Challenge Groups, but nonetheless the draft business plans so agreed did not 
meet with regulatory approval (OFWAT 2014). It is arguable that agreement was reached only 
because the Forum did not challenge Scottish Water as strongly as the WICS might have done. Yet 
that argument would imply that WICS did not remain in control of the regulatory process, as its 
statutory functions require. The documentation makes it clear that WICS would not have agreed to a 
settlement that did not meet its own requirements (WICS 2013a, 2014).  
With this support and regulatory commitment, it was possible for the Forum’s engagement 
committee to reach agreement with Scottish Water on a draft business plan well in advance of the 
expected timeline. As part of this, it was agreed that in future, SW’s performance measures will give 
(progressively) more weight to customer satisfaction, with the introduction of new Scottish 
customer experience measures (separately for household and business customers) with some of the 
features of the Service Incentive Mechanism, but tailored to the Scottish situation and especially a 
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different billing process.28 However, in order to measure trends, Scottish Water will also continue to 
report on, and have targets for, a slightly modified OPA.  
 
6. Reflections on the Process: Lessons Learned and Future Steps 
When first asked to apply to be a member of the Forum, as an academic working in the area, I saw it 
as an exciting opportunity to be involved in a new stage of the regulation of water services in 
Scotland, and further, a development that might be of use in regulating water services in other 
places. I was one of the two ordinary members with some knowledge and understanding of the 
sector, as well as the regulatory and governance contexts. At the start, there were questions around 
the Forum’s role and especially its non-statutory existence. Whilst that gave the Forum greater 
flexibility, we did discuss throughout the process, both internally and with all the regulators, how 
that might affect our legitimacy and accountability.  
Another recurrent conversation was around the composition of the Forum. Should it have been 
designed to reflect the customer base more precisely, such as hard-to- reach groups? We generally 
took the view that the correct approach (for the non-business representatives) was to be ‘informed 
laypeople’, but nonetheless laypeople who brought a mix of relevant skills and expertise. Littlechild 
(2014) has reported on the roles of both our Convenor and of the Chief Executive of Scottish Water 
and his senior team, and it is not possible to legislate (or contract) for personalities; but on the 
Forum side, careful selection was helpful and would also be important to any similar body in future. 
On the business side, both the Licensed Providers and the business customers were properly 
involved but the latter group especially would benefit from additional representation.  
 
                                                          
28 As billing arrangements are very different in Scotland, where water charges are collected with local taxation, 
and as a large part of the Service Incentive Mechanism relates to customer complaints over billing, its direct 
use in Scotland would not be possible.  
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Something we did not do, or try to do, was engage with the technical aspects of economic regulation 
as such, for example assessing efficiency or the cost of capital. We were not economists. A panel 
such as ours could have economists as members, but that might lead to some duplication or even 
conflict with the full-time role of the WICS and its staff, which we could never replicate. Perhaps this 
is just the lawyer’s natural reluctance to engage with economics, and perhaps the same arguments 
apply to us engaging in relation to consumer protection, but arguably, the latter is a better and more 
realistic use of the external layperson.    
As an academic, I have observed, and commented on, Scottish Water (and its predecessors), the 
price setting process, and the broad regulatory framework, for many years. It was fascinating to see 
that process from the inside, acquiring a new depth of understanding – of technical issues and 
regulatory processes; I hope that my wider comparative work has benefited as a result. It was a most 
enjoyable activity and if the Forum is to be reconstituted and I was asked to continue to serve, I 
would not hesitate in accepting. The future of the Forum was also a topic of discussion throughout 
the process, and indeed continuing now. Undoubtedly we all hoped the project would be seen as 
successful and beneficial, as I think it has been; and therefore might merit continuation. Several 
aspects of our work with Scottish Water indicated areas where not necessarily the Forum, but 
certainly some customer input would have a role, including developing new service improvement 
mechanisms for business customers and potentially, being part of the discussions on managing any 
outperformance above the guide limits in the tramlines. Both the Scottish Government and the 
regulators are considering this, and meantime, some Forum members continue to advise the WICS.  
If the Forum was to continue, then it might not be in the same form; various options exist. It could 
be put on a statutory footing, in which case a decision would need to be made as to whether it 
would be principally associated with WICS, with the relevant consumer body, with Scottish Water 
itself, or (as was the case) still under an agreement between the three. The latter would be the most 
complex to provide in statute, but perhaps the most comprehensive. The risks associated with being 
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‘owned’ by Scottish Water would include both ‘capture’ of Forum members and potentially 
disruption by a less positive management team. As an academic lawyer, My preference (if it was a 
choice) would probably be for alignment to the WICS – but I recognise that would be my preference 
and members more closely involved in consumer protection work (as some members would surely 
be) might see a different approach. Whilst the WICS has the responsibility to set prices and agree the 
business plan (hence my preference for WICS), and a general duty to represent customers, the 
broader policy advocacy role over water services is held by (currently) Citizens’ Advice Scotland. The 
rapidly changing consumer landscape in Scotland, both during the price review and ongoing, makes 
it more difficult to properly assess where the Forum should sit in relation to that advocacy role, and 
in relation to the representation of marginalised groups (including, perhaps, those who are not 
served by Scottish Water and therefore not really considered in our work or the business plan). 
There are also interesting questions around the regulation of other utilities or networked 
monopolies in a small jurisdiction such as Scotland. The current Scotland Bill29 devolves consumer 
responsibility, but not competition law, and discussions are underway in Scotland to identify 
mechanisms that could be put in place to implement these changes (Hill, 2014); it is clear that the 
Forum is being looked at, not just in relation to water, but as a potential model in other areas.  
That changing consumer landscape might have other implications for the Forum and initiatives like 
it. Whilst we were given extensive inputs from WICS especially, we also had (intermittent) help from 
civil servants. Some advisory input with expert knowledge of the sector to our internal work was 
recognised as being very helpful and something that a future Forum might benefit from at an earlier 
stage. However in terms of our internal membership we might have acted differently if the primary 
inputs had been from the consumer protection, rather than the regulatory, side. For myself, as a 
lawyer, I would think on balance that the most important inputs came from WICS but if a new 
consumer body was created, the Forum might sensibly be located within its broader remit.  
                                                          





Going forward, the Forum officially came to an end under the cooperation agreement in March 
2015, and no decision has yet been made as to what, if anything, will take its place. The 
Government, WICS, Scottish Water and the other regulators are keen to retain a strong customer 
focus in the 2018 mid-point investment review and subsequent strategic reviews. The Forum’s 
legacy report did canvass various options, including placing the Forum on a statutory basis; and 
Scottish Water’s business plan identifies several ongoing initiatives around performance monitoring 
which could be taken forward by a body with a role similar to the Forum.  
Whilst the intention behind the Customer Challenge Groups in England was similar, and within a 
similar broad regulatory process, the Forum could be seen as more successful. Undoubtedly it is 
easier to regulate a single entity than multiple entities, and that is a question of scale. It is difficult, 
to say the least, to envisage a large jurisdiction of 50 or 60 million people, such as England, with a 
single integrated water supplier, whether public or private. However multiple entities should also be 
helpful, to enable benchmarking. Another clear area of difference was in the composition of the 
Forum. Although not intended to be directly representative, nonetheless members were customers, 
rather than regulators or industry experts. In the English Customer Challenge Groups, consumers 
were represented through other bodies, such as the Consumer Council for Water, local authorities 
and Citizens’ Advice. A panel of laypersons is certainly transferable regardless of scale or location, 
and if sufficiently well-informed and well-supported, can bring a perspective that might otherwise be 
lacking. Subjecting members to a public sector appointments process was also important, to ensure 
independence and legitimacy.  
Information and support to the Forum came from various sources, including Scottish Water itself, 
the Government and all the regulators. Without a doubt the support and input of the WICS was 
critical, as is quite appropriate given that the WICS is the principal locus of the regulatory authority 
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and would ultimately have the power to impose a determination under the statutory framework. 
The WICS’ view that customer engagement could provide a smoother, swifter and less adversarial 
result was borne out by the Forum reaching agreement with Scottish Water several months in 
advance of the statutory timescale.  The WICS’ ‘minded to accept’ position was an important driver, 
but so too was the obligation on the parties to explain any failure to agree. The development of the 
‘tramlines’ and other aspects of the financial settlement were and are important, as they give a set 
of parameters within which there is some flexibility; this approach to price setting is also 
transferable to many different ways of regulating utilities, not just in water. That is also true of the 
‘smoothing’ of the regulatory process, across different time frames.  
It is arguable that the process in Scotland since 2002 evidences the cyclical nature of regulation (in 
any sector). The adversarial and contested settlements of the early years were data-intensive and 
demanding of resources from both the regulators and the entities. Through successive price reviews, 
as the data was better established and there was less scope for dispute, the contentious nature 
reduced. Hence over time the regulatory burden reduced, making it easier for the WICS (with the 
other regulators) to step back from the formal enforcement process and allow a body such as the 
Forum to step in. 
It is also possible that Scottish Water’s public nature was a positive asset to the process. 
Traditionally, public monopolies are seen as tending to inefficiency, in different ways and for 
different reasons than natural monopolies in the private sector. Regulation therefore is necessary to 
both, and regulation forced efficiencies upon Scottish Water in the 2000’s, just as it had in England in 
the 1990’s.  However it is at least arguable that a public supplier has fewer internal conflicts and 
fewer competing demands, and that this may make it easier to achieve a transparent regulatory 
settlement that meets multiple public goals over time.  
Yet that does not mean that a body such as the Forum can only work within the public sector, or 
indeed at a ‘high point’ in a long-term regulatory cycle, where regulator and entity are on relatively 
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cooperative terms. Whilst both of these factors may have played a part, so too did the 
empowerment of the Forum, by all of the regulators and by Government; and its essential nature as 
representing customers directly; these factors can more easily be replicated. Innovations such as this 
will always need to be designed with an eye to the specific needs and capacities of the jurisdiction in 
question, but as part of a broader governance model it is at least arguable that something like the 
Forum could play a role in utilities’ regulation in many different settings.  
 
References  
Arnstein, S. (1969) A Ladder of Citizen Participation American Institute of Planners Journal 35 216-
224.  
Bakker, K. (2003) An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatising Water in England and Wales OUP, 
Oxford.  
Cave, Martin, (2009) Independent Review of Competition and Innovation in Water Markets: Final 
Report available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69462/cave-
review-final-report.pdf (Accessed 12/08/2015) 
Customer Forum (2015) Legacy Report: Lessons learned from customer involvement in the 2015-
2021 Strategic Review of Charges available at 
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_CustomerForum.aspx (Accessed 21/08/2015) 
Doucet J and Littlechild S (2006) Negotiated settlements: the development of legal and economic 
thinking. Utilities Policy 14, December 2006, 266-277  
Dublin Statement (1992) Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, (online) 




European Commission (1991) Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 1991/271/EEC. 
European Commission (2000) Framework Directive in the Field of Water Policy 2000/60/EC.  
Fung, A. (2006), Varieties of articipation in complex governance, Public Administration Review, Vol. 
66, Supplement S1, December, pp. 66-75, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00667.x. 
Gray, D. (2011) Review of Ofwat and Consumer Representation in the Water Sector (DEFRA) 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69442/ofwat-
review-2011.pdf (accessed 12/08/2015) 
Hendry, S. (2003) Scotland’s Water – Safe Clean Affordable Public Natural Resources Journal 43 491-
517.  
Hendry, S. (2008) Water for Sale? Market Liberalisation and Public Sector Regulation in Scottish 
Water Services Utilities Law Review 16 (4) 153-162  
Hendry, S. (2010) Ownership Models for Water Services: Implications for Regulation in McHarg, A. et 
al (Eds) Property Rights in Energy and Natural Resources Law OUP Oxford.  
Hill, R. (2014) Report of the Working Group on Consumer and Competition Policy for Scotland. 
Available at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00488834.pdf (accessed 21/12/2015). 
Littlechild S (2014) The Customer Forum: Customer Engagement in the Scottish Water Sector Utilities 
Policy 31 (2014) 206-218 
Littlechild, S.C. (2008) `Constructive engagement and negotiated settlements — a prospect in the 
England and Wales water sector?', Available at  http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp- 
content/uploads/2008/11/negotiatedsettlementsew29aug08.pdf  
McDonald, D. & Ruiters, G. (Eds.) (2005) The Age of Commodity: Water Privatisation in Southern 
Africa Earthscan.  
26 
 
OECD (2011), Water Governance in OECD Countries: A Multi-Level Approach, OECD Studies on Water, 
OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119284-en  
OECD (2015) The Governance of Water Regulators, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264231092-en  
OECD (2015a) Stakeholder Engagement for Inclusive Water Governance OECD Studies on Water, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx:doi:org/10.1787/9789264231122-en   
OFWAT (2011) Involving customers in price setting – Ofwat’s customer engagement policy statement 
available at http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/pap_pos20110811custengage.pdf (Accessed 21/12/2015) 
OFWAT (2014) Setting price controls for 2015-20 – pre-qualification decisions available at 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/pap_pos20140310pr14pq.pdf  (Accessed 
21/12/2015) 
Ogus, A. (1994) Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory Clarendon Press Oxford Chapter 14.  
Renzetti, S. and Dupont, D. (2006) Ownership and Performance of Water Utilities in Chenoweth, J. 
and Bird, J. (Eds) The Business of Water and Sustainable Development Greenleaf Publishing Sheffield 
Rogers, P. and Hall, A. (2013) Effective Water Governance GWP TAC Background Paper No. 7 
available at http://www.gwp.org/en/The-Challenge/IWRM-Resources/  (accessed 12/08/2015). 
Scottish Government (2014) The Scottish Water (Objectives: 2015 to 2021) Directions 2014  available 
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0045/00459867.pdf  (Accessed 12/08/2015)  
Scottish Government (2014a) General Statement of Policy – Principles of Charging for Water Services 
2015-21 available at http://www.watercommission.co.uk/UserFiles/Documents/2015-
21%20PoC%20Statement.pdf (Accessed 12/08/2015) 
Scottish Water (2014) Business Plan 2015-21 and Appendices available at 




Scottish Water (2014a) Strategic Projections available at http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/about-
us/publications/strategic-projections (accessed 12/08/2015) 
Stephen Littlechild (2011) Regulation, customer protection and customer engagement EPRG 
Working Paper 1119 Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1142 available at 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1810/242038/cwpe1142.pdf?sequence
=1 (Accessed 12/08/2015)  
Stern, J. and Holder, S. (1999) Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of 
Regulatory Systems Utilities Policy 8 (1999) 33–50. 
Stoker G (1998) Governance as Theory: Five propositions International Social Science Journal 155 17-
27. 
Turner, G. (2013) Money Down the Drain: Getting a Better Deal for Consumers of the Water Industry 
CentreFocus available at http://www.centreforum.org/index.php/mainpublications/505-money-
down-the-drain (Accessed 120/08/2015).  
UN (1992) Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio) 
A/CONF.151/26.  
UNDP / Water Governance Facility, Stockholm International Water Institute / Water Integrity 
Network (2013), User’s Guide on Assessing Water Governance, United Nations Development 
Programme, Denmark available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/OGC/Users%20Guide
%20on%20Assessing%20Water%20Governance1.pdf (accessed 15/09/2015). 
UN/ECE (1999) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus) 38 ILM (1999) 517. 










WICS (2013a) Strategic Review of Charges 2015-21: Innovation and Choice available at 
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/UserFiles/Documents/scr%20innovation%20and%20change%2
0proof%204.pdf (accessed 12/08/2015)  
WICS (2014) Strategic Review of Charges 2015-21: Draft Determination available at 
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/UserFiles/Documents/scr%20innovation%20and%20change%2
0proof%204.pdf (accessed 12/08/2015)  
World Bank (2004) Water Resources Sector Strategy available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/01/000090341_20040601150257
/Rendered/PDF/28114.pdf (Accessed 12/08/2015). 
 
 
